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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
TORT LIABILITY

The cases on immunity from tort liability must be discussed with
chronological reference to Moore v. Moyle.38 Cases before the Moore decision gave immunity for various considerations.3 9 The Moore case represents the modern trend away from charitable immunity. 40 It held that a
judgment against a charitable institution was valid but could not be satisfied by trust funds. Therefore, charitable institutions are liable to the ex41
tent that they have liability insurance.
CONCLUSION

It appears that the most notable development in the law of charitable
trusts is in the field of tort liability. The distinction between cy pres and
equity's inherent powers poses the problem of which to apply. Some
courts have been reluctant to apply cy pres while others apply it very
liberally, arriving at the same result but leaving doubt as to the propriety
of its application. Strict conformance with the tax exemption statutes set
requirements of (1) ownership by a charitable organization and (2) exclusive use for charitable purposes. The public benefit attributed to charitable trusts makes the law pertaining thereto a matter of increasing concern.
38 405 111. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
39 Meyers v. Y.M.C.A. 316 Ill. App. 177,44 N.E. 2d 755 (1942). In Lenahen v. Ancilla
Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N.E. 2d 445 (1947), immunity was based on consider-

ations of public policy and on the theory that respondeat superior did not apply.
40See

Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y. 2d 656, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1957), noted in 7 DePaul L.

Rev. 131 (1957) infra.
41 Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Ill., 1954) which held that the existence of
trust funds need not be alleged in a complaint. The district court reiterated the fact that
immunity such as it exists is not immunity to liability, but rather to execution of the
judgment on trust funds; Slenker v. Gordon, 344 Ill. App. 1, 100 N.E. 2d 354 (1951);
W'endt v. Servite Fatherl, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E. 2d 342 (1947).

REDISTRICTING WARDS

"Ward" is of teutonic origin and has a variety of meanings all of which
spring from the general idea of a military guard or protector. Thus, a person elected from such section is considered a protector of a geographical
part as distinguished from the city as a whole.'
Wards do not possess any power of local self-government, and are
erected exclusively for the purpose of securing representation in the city
government. The method of determining the number and the manner of
1 Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E. 2d 227, 231 (1953).
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fixing such subdivisions may be prescribed by statute or by charter.2 Frequently such power is conferred upon the municipal corporation by the
legislature of the state. 3 Such a confirmation of power is not questioned
generally, as the legislature can and usually does require the division of a
city into wards to be done by persons not of its own membership. Any
appropriate existing board of public officers might be selected for the
purpose. 4 Sometimes the question of the division of wards is determined
by a vote of the local electorate5 and other times by a court.6 However,
in any of these methods, the power to act must come from legislative authority and without such authority, the municipal legislature, or whatever
method is used, cannot act.7
The legislature may specify what standards are to be used on redivision, 8 or may grant partial discretion as to certain matters therewith,9 or
grant complete discretion to the local government. 10
A city council, although intrusted with discretionary powers, may fail
to redistrict at the proper time. In State ex rel Ingold v. Mayor and Common Council of City of Madison, wherein the council had not been able
to arrive at a determination as to the proper redistricting of the city, the
court stated:
2

A typical statute: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 24, §§ 21-36. The city of Chicago shall be
divided into fifty wards. In the formation of wards the population of each shall be as
nearly equal as practicable and each shall be composed of contiguous and compact territory; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 24, §§ 21-38. On or before the first day of December, of
the year following the year in which the national census is taken, and every ten years
thereafter, the city council shall by ordinance redistrict the city on the basis of the
national census of the preceding year. All elections of aldermen shall be held from the
existing wards until a redistricting is had as provided for in this article; 11.Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 24, §§ 21-38.
3People v. Young, 38 111.490 (1865). Accord: Granger v. Minneapolis, 182 Minn. 147,
233 N.W. 821 (1930); State ex rel Comstock v. Stewart, 52 Neb. 243, 71 N.W. 998
(1897); State ex rel Childs v. Darrow, 65 Minn. 419, 67 N.W. 1012 (1896); People v.
Danville, 147 Ill. 127, 35 N.E. 154 (1893).
4 Miller v. Chicago, 348 Ill. 34, 180 N.E. 627 (1932); Granger v. Minneapolis, 182
Minn. 147, 233 N.W. 821 (1930); Fitzgerald v. Curley, 220 Mass. 503, 108 N.E. 355
(1915); State ex rel Neacy v. Milwaukee, 150 Wis. 616, 138 N.W. 76 (1912).
5 Swindle v. State, 143 Ind. 153, 42 N.E. 528 (1895).
6 Tyronne Bourough, 13 Pa. C. 651 (1893). Accord: Latrobe Borough, 33 Pa. C. 611,
612 (1907): "Strictly, the court is without authority to redivide a borough into wards,
but, as it has the power to erect new wards, to divide any ward or to alter the lines of
any two or more adjoining wards, indirectly, it can lawfully redivide a borough into
wards."
7People v. Young, 38 Ill. 490 (1865).
8 Osgood v. Clark, 26 N.H. 307 (1853).
9 Grimmell v. Des Moines, 57 Iowa 144, 10 N.W. 330 (1881).
10 People v. Danville, 147 Ill. 127, 35 N.E. 154 (1893).
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The statute makes it mandatory upon the common council to make a new
ward in the city.... It leaves open as a matter of discretion only the manner in
which such new ward shall be created.... The writ herein does not attempt to
control or regulate the manner in which the common council shall exercise that
discretion, but only effectuates the mandate of the statute. Where there is a
plain duty, as here involved, it is a well-recognized and long-established doctrine that compliance therewith may be enforced by mandamus. 11
Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel a city council to perform its
mandatory duties prescribed by the charter or statute. The writ, however,
may not compel an officer to perform the duties in a particular way. It
will be issued only to require the performance of ministerial duties. The
exercise of discretion on the part of such an officer will not be interfered
with in that proceeding except for arbitrary disregard of the law or for
flagrant abuse of discretion. 1 2 Therefore, mandamus is the proper remedy
to compel the performance of a duty devolving upon municipal authorities by statute. 13
Should the city council act to redistrict the wards, their motives in exercising their discretion will not, as a general rule, be made the subject of
inquiry by the courts, 14 since the legislature intrusted the duty and responsibility of redistricting to the judgment and discretion of the city
council.' 5 Therefore, unless the complainant can show actual loss of property or that the action is unreasonable and arbitrary, he cannot enjoin the
city from redistricting the wards. In a bill to restrain the city from so
11 170 Wis. 133, 134, 174 N.W. 471, 472 (1919).
12 Beckman v. Talbot, 278 N.Y. 146, 15 N.E. 2d 556 (1938). Accord: Comer v. Epps,
149 Ga. 57, 99 S.E. 120 (1919); Leftridge v. Sacramento, 59 Cal. App. 2d 516, 139 P. 2d
112 (1943); cf. American Distilling Co. v. City Council of Sausalito, 34 Cal. 2d 660, 666,
202 P. 2d 125, 129 (1949), wherein the court stated: "While the courts are loath to
interfere with the legislative process, they must interfere when the legislative body is
acting without power or refuses to obey the plain mandate of law." The court continues at page 130: "The rule is stated in 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.,
pp. 2648, 2657, thus: 'A writ of mandamus will, where it is an appropriate remedy, be
granted against municipal corporations and their officers whenever they refuse or unreasonably neglect to perform any duty clearly enjoined upon them by charter, or
statute, or law, and there is no ordinary or specific legal remedy adequate to enforce
the right of the public, or the particular legal right of the relator. The general rule is
this: If the inferior tribunal, corporate body, or public agent or officer has a discretion,
and acts and exercises it, this discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus. But if the
inferior tribunal, body, officers, or agents refuse to act in cases where the law requires
them to act, and the party has no other legal remedy, and where, in justice, there ought
to be one, a mandamus will lie to set them in motion, to compel action; and, in proper
cases, the court will settle the legal principles which should govern, but without controlling the discretion of the subordinate jurisdiction, body, or officer.'"
13 Fort Meade v. State ex rel Rose, 120 Fla. 177, 162 So. 350 (1935); cf. Morris and
Cummings Dredging Co. v. Bayonne, 75 N.J.L. 59,67 Ad. 20 (1907).
14 Tribune Co. v. Thompson, 342 II1. 503, 174 N.E. 561 (1930).
15 Miller v. Chicago, 348 Ill. 34, 180 N.E. 627 (1932).
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doing, on grounds that it would result in a waste of the taxpayers' money,
the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It is a general, well-established, and recognized rule in this state that the jurisdiction of a court of equity pertains only to the maintenance of civil, personal,
and property rights and that it has no jurisdiction over matters
or questions of
a political nature unless civil property rights are involved. 16
Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly,
in the establishment or management of government. Civil rights are those
which have no relation to the establishment, support or management of
the government. These consist in the power of acquiring and enjoining
property, of exercising the paternal and marital powers, and the like. 7
The distinction between civil rights and political rights is stated in Sheri-

dan v. Colvin:
[The] . . . subject matter of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery is civil

property. The court is conversant only with questions of property and the
maintenance of civil rights. Injury to property, whether actual or prospective,
is the foundation on which jurisdiction rests. The court has no jurisdiction in
matters merely criminal or merely immoral, which do not affect any right to
property. Nor do matters of a political character come within the jurisdiction
of the court of chancery. Nor has the court of chancery jurisdiction to interfere
with the public duties of any department of government, except under special
circumstances, and where necessary for the protection of rights of property.S

The conclusion is, therefore, that unless personal or property rights are
involved, or the result obtained by the exercise of the council's discretion,
is so capricious or arbitrary so as to be unreasonable, a court of equity will
not intervene and declare the act invalid. 19
In the exercise of the council's discretion, equal population distribution,
which is often required by statute,20 and natural boundaries are to be considered in the redivision of the wards:
16 Ibid., at 35 and 628.

17Board of Education v. Board of Education, 11 111. App. 2d 408, 137 N.E. 2d 721
(1956).
18 78 In.237, 247 (1875).
19 Miller v. Chicago, 348 Ill. 34, 180 N.E. 627 (1932). As a general rule a court of

equity will not enjoin a municipal legislative body from exercising legislative powers,
even though its action may be unconstitutional or ultra vires, and persons aggrieved
by such action are remitted to the remedies available after the legislative function has
been exercised. Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361 Ill. 213, 197 N.E. 567 (1935); Roby v. Chicago,
215 Ill. 604, 74 N.E. 768 (1905); Chicago v. Evans, 24 Ill. 52 (1860). An exception would
be where the proposed action of the council violates a law which prohibits adoption of
such an ordinance, as distinguished from mere ultra vires action. Connell v. Baton
Rouge, 153 La. 788,96 So. 657 (1922), or where the mere adoption will work irreparable
damage beyond the remedy of an injunction sought after the adoption of the ordinance.
People ex rel. Negus v. Dwyer, 90 N.Y. 402 (1882).
20 Authority cited note 2 supra.
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The mandate of the statute is not that the population of each ward shall be
equal but "as nearly equal as practicable." Manifestly, in dividing the city into
wards many elements enter, such as natural or artificial dividing lines, rivers,
transportation facilities, the use of well-known streets, the congruity or incongruity of the population, and are properly given consideration ....

The redis-

tricting of the city into wards is a legislative power conferred by the statute
upon the city council. From the nature of the power to be exercised and from
the language of the act it is evident that it was not the intention or expectation
of the legislature that the division into wards should be made by the council with
mathematical exactitude as to population but that variations therefrom were intended to be left to the practical exercise of sound discretion of the council upon
21
a consideration of the varying elements and difficulties entering into the task.
Thus, equity will not enjoin the acts of a city council in the use of their
granted legislative discretion unless the circumstances previously enumerated exist. Nor will quo warranto test the use of discretion as such by the
municipal council.2 2 Quo warranto is a demand by the state upon some
individual or corporation, municipal or otherwise, to show by what right
it exercises some franchise or privilege concerning the state, which allegedly cannot legally be done because of the constitution or the law of
the forum, unless by virtue of a grant of authority from the state.23 In
other words, quo warranto applies to the right of a person or corporation
to exercise the function of public office; and not to the validity of the
24
acts of that office as such, let alone to the discretion used in such acts.
Although certiorari has been used to test the validity of a council's action,25 it does not lie to review the exercise of discretion.2

6

A body,

municipal or otherwise, to which power has been intrusted, does not exer21 Miller v. Chicago, 348 Ill. 34, 38, 180 N.E. 627, 629 (1932). Accord: People ex rel
Boyle v. Cruise, 197 App. Div. 705, 189 N.Y.S. 338 (1921), aff'd 231 N.Y. 639, 132 N.E.
920 (1921); Moore v. Georgetown, 127 Ky. 409, 105 S.W. 905, 906 (1907): "It is true
that fair representation and equal apportionment is a valuable privilege, and one that

should be adhered to; but, when the legislative department of the state that created
these municipalities and provided an elaborate plan for their government failed to adopt
either directly or by implication any scheme to regulate or control them in the selection of their legislative boards, we do not feel that the courts are warranted in interfering with the discretion lodged in the people of these cities and their representatives

whose duty it is to divide the city into wards."
22 Generally speaking, quo warranto proceedings are of a legal nature. People v.
White Circle League of America, 408 I11.564, 97 N.E. 2d 811 (1951).
23 State v. Perkins, 138 Kan. 899, 28 P. 2d 765 (1934); State v. Harris, 3 Ark. 570
(1841).
24 Smith v. Dillon, 267 App. Div. 39,44 N.Y.S. 2d 719 (1943); Paten v. Miller, 190 Ga.
123, 8 S.E. 2d 757 (1940).
25 It was held in New Jersey that citizens whose domiciles have been changed by a
resolution of the council altering the ward limits of the city may bring certiorari to
test the validity of the action of the council. State v. Bayonne, 54 N.J.L. 125, 22 Atl.
1006 (1891).
26 City of Harvey v. Dean, 62 Ill. App. 41 (1895).
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cise judicial action merely because it is vested with discretion, or may
exercise judgment. Almost all ministerial officers are intrusted with some
degree of discretion, and all legislative bodies not only use discretion but
2
also judgment in whatever they do. 1
When a writ of certiorari is issued for the purpose of reviewing the
proceedings of a municipality, it is for the purpose only of determining
the legality of the proceedings reviewed, and the judgment will be
whether that proceeding is valid or invalid, not whether it was wise or
discreet, 2s and only those proceedings which are judicial or quasi-judicial
in nature will be reviewed.2 9 As the leading case of Fitzgerald v. Curley
states:
The essential character of the establishment of the municipal subdivisions of
cities known as wards, when undertaken either by the Legislature itself or
through deputies named by it, is political and not judicial. It is an adminstrative
aspect of a legislative function which under our plan of government may be
conferred upon subordinate officers. But the nature of the act is not changed by
its being performed through a delegated instrumentality selected by the legislature rather than by the legislature itself. The determination of that number of
wards between the limits named in this statute and the division of the territory
of the city into the number of wards, having regard to the natural configuration
wraught by the harbor, inlets of the sea and rivers, and other well defined
boundaries, so as to contain within reasonable limits of variation an equal number of voters, is not a judicial act. It demands a careful study of local conditions
and the exercise of sound judgment. But it is administrative or political, not judicial or quasi-judicial in character. The discretion of the city council in performing such a duty is not subject to review by this court upon a writ of certiorari.
That process is available only for the purpose of examining and correcting the
errors of law manifest upon the record of some tribunal in its performance of
judicature, and to restrain the excesses of jurisdiction of inferior courts or
officers acting judicially.30
Thus, from the foregoing it can be seen that when a municipality has been
imbued, by the legislature of the state, with discretionary powers to redistrict the wards, and fails to do so, a writ of mandamus can be used to
compel them to act. However, once they do act, the courts will not inquire into the motives or use of that discretionary power unless it is
flagrantly abused or injures property.
As has been stated, the purpose of dividing the municipal area into
wards or subdivisions is to give each and every part of the city representaIbid.
28 Hyslop v. Finch, 99 111. 171 (1881).
29 State v. Albritton, 251 Ala. 422, 37 So. 2d 640 (1948); City of Harvey v. Dean,
62 111. App. 41 (1895). Accord: Birchwood Knolls, Inc. v. Hunter, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 606
(1955); Appeal of Common School Dists. Nos. 27, 20, 5 and 3, Faribault County, 232
Minn. 342, 45 N.W. 2d 657 (1951); Rhode Island Home Builders v. Hunt, 74 R.I. 255,
60 A. 2d 496 (1948); Stacy v. Haverhill, 316 Mass. 759, 57 N.E. 2d 564 (1944).
30 220 Mass. 503, 108 N.E. 355 (1915).
27
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tion. For example in Illinois, some cities have adopted the "City Election
31
Law" whereby they can form their own election precincts or districts:
for city elections the city council, and not the county board, should establish
the boundaries of the election precincts or districts ... but that in such cities for
city elections the ward lines must necessarily be considered in forming election
districts. As a practical matter in carrying on and conducting a city election
where the city is divided into wards, we do not see how it can be reasonably
argued that the ward lines can be ignored in forming and fixing the boundaries
of election districts or precincts, otherwise it would be impossible to elect the
32
aldermen.

Furthermore it would be unreasonable to cross ward lines in forming the
boundary lines if an election district though such ward may be divided
into several districts or precincts, 33 and in which case the voter must have
resided in the precinct thirty days before election.3 4 Then it would be
likely that when wards are redistricted the voting precincts would also
have to be redistricted so as not to cross into other wards. Should the
wards be redistricted within thirty days before an election, and as a result,
the precincts were redistricted within thirty days prior to an election,
this would not invalidate the election, 33 although the likelihood of such an
occurrence would be slight;36 and since a thirty-day residence is required
in the precinct in order to vote37 the court would not be justified in holds
ing the votes to be illegal because of the change of the districts.A
In case a new election district should be formed for the organization of a new
town or ward or the incorporation of a city or town, the judges or inspectors of
the election in the new district formed should make their registry of electors,
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, S 6.
32

People v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426, 430, 108 N.E. 699, 701 (1915).

33 The terms "district" or "precinct" have been used interchangeably. The meaning
of those words must be gathered very largely from the connection in which they are
used in each instance. People v. Markiewicz, 225 111.563, 80 N.E. 256 (1907). A district
is a division of a territory made for administrative, electoral, or other purposes, and an
election district has been generally supposed to mean the territory constituting a voting
district or precinct. Donovan v. Comerford, 332 111.230, 163 N.E. 657 (1928).
14 People v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426, 108 N.E. 699 (1915); Welch v. Shumway, 232 111.
54,
83 N.E. 549 (1907). Consult Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, §§ 6-27.
35 People v. Quilici, 309 Ill. App. 466, 33 N.E. 2d 492 (1941).
36 Consult Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, § § 11-1 and 6-16; Welch v. Shumway, 232 111.
54, 83 N.E. 549 (1907). It is to be noted at this point that it would be extremely unlikely
that an election would be held within thirty days of redistricting in the City of Chicago
due to Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 24, §§ 21-39 which provide for the city council to submit
the proposed ordinance of redistricting to a popular vote at the next election to be held
in the city.
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 46, § 6-27.
3
8 Welch v. Shumway, 232 111. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1907).
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which should embrace the names of such persons as were known to the electors
in their district.3 9
In fact, the thirty-day residence requirement would probably be interpreted as directory only, for where a statute does not declare the performance of certain duties by public officials in connection with the election to
be essential to the validity of the election, it will be regarded as mandatory
if such matters affect the real merits, but will be considered directory
only, and not vital to the election, unless they are such, in themselves, as
40
to change or render doubtful the result.
As a result of the aforementioned, it can be deduced that the altering of
ward boundaries will have little affect upon the legality of an election so
long as the precincts are not part of more than one ward.
The most important thing about redistricting wards is to redistrict the
'wards, and secure as practicably as possible, equal population in each ward
so as to secure equal representation, as well as an equal vote, in the affairs
41
of the municipal government.
3

9 Donovan v. Comerford, 332 Ill. 230, 233, 163 N.E. 657, 658 (1928).

4

o People ex rel. Agnew v. Graham, 267 Ill. 426, 108 N.E. 699 (1915).

41

Hammond v. Young, 117 N.E. 2d 227 (1953).

WIRE-TAP EVIDENCE: AN AREA OF ADMISSIBILITY?
The admissibility or inadmissibility of wire-tap evidence is a much
discussed topic. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has favored
the exclusion of this type of evidence, that is the rule followed in the federal courts today.' Those who favor the inadmissibility of wire-tap evidence contend that federal legislation such as Section 605 of Title 47,2 and
the interpretation given it by the United States Supreme Court 3 were
necessary to protect the individual's right of privacy. It is well established
that privacy is the thing which is being protected and that the divulgence
of wire-tapping data is an invasion of privacy. 4 On the other hand, though
such protection of privacy is necessary it should not, and Congress did
not intend it to, hamper or obstruct the exercise of the governmental police powers.
The Nardone case sets forth what is the basic problem:
It is urged that a construction be given the section (605) which would exclude federal agents since it is improbable Congress intended to hamper and
impede the activities of the government in the detection and punishment of
1 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).

48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp., 1956).
3 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
4 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Diamond v. United States, 108 F.2d
859 (C.A. 6th, 1938); Accord: 41 Am. Jur., Privacy S 29 (1942).
2

